


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QUATERNITY OR PATROLOGY?

Paul R. Hinlicky

If I had double the space allotted to me, I would fill it singing the praises of this noble-minded work. Soulen seeks to reconcile the divided (105–18) with a genuinely fresh approach. His writing is a model of lucidity, stylistically elegant, alternately trenchant and doxological. I can only register a yes and amen to his manner of proceeding from the economic to the eternal Trinity (129) via “biblical dogmatics” (127) under the conviction of faith that the heritage is given (7) in order to be received and developed and thus renewed (78). In passing, the critique of McFague’s “metaphorical theology” is laugh-out-loud hilarious (238). *Und so weiter*. . . . Yet, being a partisan in the conflict that Soulen would conciliate, I have to register a number of questions.¹ These requests for clarification, I trust, can be received as immanent to the book’s project of speaking triply the Triune Name in an appropriately complex way (119–23).² I will recapitulate the essentials of Soulen’s case, indicating from the outset the unclarity that I find, before registering the (narrow) point in my possible dissent and accounting for it.

Endnote 11 of chapter 8 notes an “unhappy paradox” that Jacques Derrida finds in Soulen’s *Haupttext*, Exod 3:14–15, the gift of the divine Name: “Translate me, don’t translate me. On the one hand, don’t trans-

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1. Paul R. Hinlicky, “Secular and Eschatological Conceptions of Salvation in the Controversy over the Invocation of God,” in *This Is My Name Forever: The Trinity and Gender Language for God*, ed. Alvin F. Kimel Jr. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), 213–39.

2. As I myself have sought in Paul R. Hinlicky, *Divine Complexity: The Rise of Creedal Christianity* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010).

late me, that is, respect me as a proper name. . . . And, on the other hand, translate me, that is, understand me, preserve me within the universal language, follow my law, and so on.” Soulen notes Derrida’s perplexity at the coalescence of apophatic and kataphatic ways in the text only in order to assert that the apparent contradiction is “simply transcended” when the purely referential proper name, YAHWEH, and the interpretative paraphrases of it as “I AM,” or “I AM WHO I AM,” are “*taken together*” (273, emphasis original). The kataphatic assertion of the divine proper name, the Tetragrammaton, revered apophatically by its nonpronunciation and the substitution of surrogate terms for it in Jewish piety, yields a real albeit mysterious Subject who nevertheless comes to the predicates own and bless by the many names creatures ascribe to it as the I AM who will be for them Shepherd and King, Friend and Lover, Rock and Womb, as creaturely need contextually requires.

This key move of qualifying apophatically the kataphatic has promise. Such kataphatic predicates, variably refracted in the finite language of the creature’s praise and thanksgiving by the Spirit’s Pentecostal work, are determined in turn by their contextual suitability to articulate the constant of the divine *presence* and *blessing* of this uncanny, ever elusive Subject. The divine Subject, as indicated by the oblique Tetragrammaton, *causes* that Name (YAHWEH) to be remembered in order to *come* and to *bless* in all the variegated situations of creaturely need. Soulen mines this threefold articulation of God as cause, presence, and blessing from Exod 20:24b, and he names it the primary “theological pattern” of Trinitarian discourse. It tells of divine uniqueness from the vantage point of the first of the Trinitarian Persons. After sorting out how subsequent Christological and Pneumatological patterns and their relations also articulate the divine uniqueness of the first Person, each in its own ways, Soulen concludes that the “most appropriate way of naming the persons of the Trinity consists precisely in the three patterns together, as mutually illuminating, nonidentical repetitions of each other” (255).

The innovative and critical edge of Soulen’s argument is that the first pattern, with its foregoing basis in the Hebrew Scriptures, has as such gone unacknowledged in Christian theological history, even though it is silently operative throughout, even in the Nicene Creed. The church has never ceased also to speak of the LORD, in this way with Israel reverencing the divine Name by a surrogate term. Jesus Himself and the apostles regularly employ the divine passive. When Jesus addresses God as Abba-Father, He is speaking of none other than the God of Israel, just as gentile believers adopted into His filial relation with God turn from idols to the true and living God of the fathers, who gave His Name at the burning bush, who causes His name to be remembered in order to come and to bless. But loss of articulate awareness about this primary pattern of Trinitarian naming due to the original schism of Jews and gentiles has had

debilitating consequences. Its loss has worked to pit the other two subsequent patterns of Trinitarian naming against each other. The Christological pattern of kinship terms—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—then claims for itself a stifling exclusivity at the price of kataphatic absurdity (as in contemporary perceptions of Father and Son as privileging masculine gender). The Pneumatological pattern of open-ended ternaries (as in Augustine's "vestiges" or in contemporary experimentation, e.g., "Mother, Lover, Friend") liberates itself from Christological exclusivity and kataphatic absurdity at the terrible price of an ultimate agnosticism: we can play with many names for God just because no name names God truly or adequately. But, Soulen proposes, when we recover awareness of the primary "theological" pattern, we learn anew how to let all three patterns have their proper place and play in mutually enlightening ways. This is so because the Hebrew apophatism—of reverencing the divine Name by referring to it obliquely—honors divine uniqueness not in spite of but on account of the gift of the Name. It does not sign a God beyond God, but gives God in presence and blessing, making this self-donation the true indication of the mystery of divine being in the Trinitarian mutualities.

So I understand with approbation the thrust of Soulen's case. Yet in an unfortunate formulation, he can also write, "While the uniqueness of the first person can be represented by a variety of linguistic tokens (Father, Font of Divinity, etc.), there is only one of these whose role consists solely in pointing, in gesturing away from itself to the transcendent, unfathomable mystery of its bearer" (254)—namely, the Tetragrammaton. Such formulations would seem to sketch a rather different argument: that the mystery of divine being lies beyond in some unknowable transcendence rather than in causing presence and blessing. Nor is this other line of argument without a significant role in Soulen's book. The gift of the apophatic sign gives a true, albeit transcendent and incomprehensible, divine Subject to which our naming of God in turn is accountable. This, let us say, "Barthian" move serves to preclude the Feuerbachian reduction of God as Subject to the empty cipher on which to hang human projections—the great vulnerability of the unhinged Pneumatological pattern.

We are rightly commanded not to take the name of God in vain as a first principle in theology. The question therefore is whether Soulen proposes obedience to this rule by means of an apophatic reserve of a kataphatic Name or by construing the Name instead as an apophatic sign. The latter arises out of the polyonymy of divine names seeking God beyond the gods, beyond language, by direct intuition in the mystics, by a beatific vision in heaven, or in infinite resignation, as in Derrida. This latter apophatism stems from the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius, which asserts an infinite divine essence beyond all naming (62–67). In this tradition, not only St. Thomas (as Soulen discusses) but also (as I would note) the

Lutheran Thomas, Johann Gerhard, take the Tetragrammaton to indicate the absolutely simple divine substance or *ousia*, not then, if I understand Soulen's intention correctly, as the hypostasis of the First of the Three. Unbaptized, or insufficiently catechized, the Dionysian train of thought leads either to gross modalism or to the more subtle error of teaching a quaternity, where the unknowable divine essence is de facto hypostasized as God beyond the named Persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

My question seeking clarification arises here. Despite his better judgment and incisive critique of the "profound ambiguity" (66) of the Dionysian tradition, does Soulen escape this latter difficulty of a subtle quaternity? If not, does he land again on the horns of Derrida's dilemma? By segregating the Tetragrammaton and the Father of our Lord into different personal patterns of Trinitarian discourse (the "theological" and the "Christological," respectively) is Soulen thinking a God beyond God? I doubt that this is what Soulen intends, but I don't see that he clearly avoids being read this way.

Thus to my potential dissent, Soulen names the first pattern "theological" rather than "patrological." Soulen, citing Thomas, rightly avers that the very *gift* of the divine Name means that *deus non est in genere*, but surely he ought to continue, as the argument would seem indicate, *sed in nomine*. The very opacity of the divine Name, YAHWEH, indicates a Who, a Subject—that is, an inscrutability, a God hidden also in this revelation, thus a *deus absconditus*, just as the first half of John 1:18 concurs, "No one has ever seen God." But this inscrutability is asserted so that we may "come and see" (John 1:46), eyes open and ears alert for the coming and blessing this very questionable God promises in giving this unutterable name to be remembered in all its mystery. Surely then, just on this basis, Christian theology must continue in all offensive exclusiveness to make the anti-Arian claim, "It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father's heart, who has made him known," just as John 1:18 concludes.

If Christian theology takes the Tetragrammaton as God's question for us about God's identity in time and space and the manifestation of the Trinity as God's answer to God's own question in the fullness of time, this construal of salvation history would reflect both the continuity and the novelty between the testaments that Soulen requires, provided that the question indicated by the Tetragrammaton is preserved in the answer as a living one.

Between Soulen and my possible dissent there may lie an issue of epistemic access. We cannot begin theology, even as "biblical dogmatics," with the final form of the canonical text, as if it had fallen intact from heaven. The Christian theological subject is formed by baptism in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Baptismal seeing and hearing gives a *deus revelatus*, albeit for faith alone and so ever against

the background of divine inscrutability, if I may cite here Martin Luther's catechetical teaching on the baptismal creed:

For in all three articles God himself has revealed and opened to us the most profound depths of his fatherly heart and his pure, *unutterable* love [*unaussprechlicher* Liebe, emphasis added]. For this very purpose he created us, so that he might redeem us and make us holy, and, moreover, having granted and bestowed us everything in heaven and on earth, he has also given us his Son and his Holy Spirit, through whom he bring us to himself.³

Here we have an apophatic qualification of the kataphatic affirmation at the heart of the gospel: the inscrutable Name of God opens its mystery as a fiery furnace of love for us in the divine self-donation of the Son sent from the Father's heart to reclaim us in the Spirit. It is this kataphatic self-donation, and this alone as it named and confessed and so believed, that overcomes Derrida's unhappy paradox. It is not overcome by merely asserting the univocity of the canonical text in its final form, which begs the question of how the unity of the testaments is to be conceived and who it is who so perceives their unity.

Having revealed the Lutheran provenance of my reservation about the way Soulen formulates the "theological" pattern of Trinitarian naming, permit me further to quarrel with Soulen's clichéd interpretation of Luther together with his account of the theological sin of Christian supersessionism in respect to God's covenant with Israel. The two go painfully together in post-Holocaust theology.

First, as Jacob Neusner has taught us and none less than Richard L. Rubenstein has recently acknowledged, there can be neither normative Judaism nor early Catholic Christianity without supersessionism in *some* sense, *carefully* to be defined.⁴ For *both Jew and Christian*, the LORD has put an end to the sacrificial system of worship in the Jerusalem Temple. For the rabbis this happened on account of the sins of the Jewish people with the result that Judaism in diaspora must now become a living temple, making a true sacrifice of praise and good works. For Catholics this has happened on account of Messiah's cross, which once and for all fulfilled and thus in one sense preserved and in another abrogated the instituted rites of atonement in the Temple, with the result that the mission of the gospel to the nations proceeds, founding Eucharistic communities

3. *The Book of Concord*, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), p. 439, para. 64.

4. Jacob Neusner with William Scott Green, *Writing with Scripture: The Authority and the Uses of the Hebrew Bible in the Torah of Formative Judaism* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg/Fortress, 1989). Richard L. Rubenstein, "Religion and the Uniqueness of the Holocaust," in *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*, ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum (Philadelphia, PA: Westview, 2009), 40.

in anticipation of Messiah's coming in glory.⁵ It is, then, *quite another thing* to continue on from these foundational Jewish and Christian convictions on the supersession of the Temple to the teaching that God has rejected His people Israel. Wherever triumphalist Christian or despairing Jewish thought comes to this, it errs.

In spite of his sharp (albeit undifferentiated in the foregoing way) judgment against Christian supersessionism (147), Soulen himself acknowledges that "in the final analysis, the reliability of God's presence is not a function of the temple per se, but of the name that he has caused to dwell in it. Just as God once freely chose the temple, so he remains free to abandon it" (154, cf. 172). By the same token of divine freedom, God may give His Name as a question and in the fullness of time give His Name anew as an answer to His own question. In this light, to play a post-Holocaust supersessionism card against Luther in an undifferentiated way—"Luther regards the Tetragrammaton as superseded by the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is, fulfilled according to its inner meaning and outmoded according to its external form" (91; this is also the fault Soulen finds in Jenson, 108)—is not to indict Luther so much as the entire Catholic tradition beginning with the New Testament. In this connection, Soulen merely repeats the cliché that Luther reduces the divine Name, standing for the irreducible divine Subject, to its meaning for us (88). While this reduction may be true of some modern versions of Lutheranism, Soulen would have the historical Martin Luther guilty of affirming emphatically the divine Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and at the same time of reducing theology to anthropology. That would be quite a feat.

The heart of the unclarity is that Soulen wants rhetorically to confine patrology to the second, Christological pattern of Trinitarian discourse but cannot in fact sustain this artificial separation: "the gospel introduces a new way of naming God, one that supplements and transforms its understanding of the name, 'Yahweh,' but not one that takes its place" (108).⁶ This amounts to quibbling about the three senses of the German verb *aufheben*: to cancel, to preserve, to fulfill (99–100). Naming the first Person as Father articulates God's uniqueness not "as such [i.e., as supposedly does the Tetragrammaton], but rather [as] presence: the first person is the *Father* of the Son" (231), the One whose very being is in coming" (178). Does that not imply, however, that the Tetragrammaton taken as apophatic sign articulates the first Person as absence, as infinite, surplus *beyond* the named God of the second and third patterns rather

5. The depth of this ecumenical conviction is visible in Matthew Levering's study, *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

6. I borrow the term "patrology" from Robert W. Jenson, *Systematic Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1:115.

than *in* them? Does Soulen's first "theological" pattern name God as *ousia* or as *hypostasis*?

By my lights, Soulen surely intends to speak of the first divine Person as *hypostasis*, not *ousia*. But the question is, if His name is and evidently remains as the unutterable question mark, YAHWEH, only made utterable for us as Father through the coming to us of the Son and blessing of the Spirit, whether an abyss opens here between *hypostasis* and *ousia*. Against this danger, I would argue that there is no divine essence existing apart, transcendentally causing things in general, which may or may not be connected to its own real presence in the Son and blessing in the Spirit as the eternal Father. If that is so, the divine essence *is* the Father of the Son and breather of the Spirit. Consequently, Soulen's repeated paraphrases of the "theological" Person amount to kataphatic patrology insofar as they avoid agnostic essentialism: "as a kind of *fons divinitatis*" (23), "whose voice sounds the mystery of divine uniqueness at the source of the divine life" (177), "the sourceless source of all the music of the divine life" (173). We are in such deliverances indeed given the first Person in its divine uniqueness not as a purely abiding question mark, not, as the Arian reification of a mere negation, an *Agennetos* or its modern equivalent, *das Unbedingt*. But we are given the Person, the very Subject who took the name YAHWEH as a self-introduction to "come and see," hence in the fullness of time as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the unbegotten begetter of the Son and unbreathed breather of the Spirit. This is God's revealed uniqueness as the eternal Father strong to save, which remains mystery also in its revealedness. That this Father is not my father or your father but our Father by virtue of baptismal adoption into the family of God, hence our *heavenly* Father, suffices to preserve the penumbra of mystery that from the beginning of salvation history was indicated by gift of the divine Name to His people, Israel.

not emphasize as much as I should have that *unity-in-multiplicity* is essential to the blessing we receive from the Spirit of "the one God."

Since I didn't emphasize unity as much as I should have in the book, permit me to say now that I believe all three patterns of naming the Trinity provide a way of envisioning the Spirit's gift of unity, each time in a way characteristic of that particular pattern. In the context of the theological pattern, unity often appears as creaturely solidarity in the acknowledgment of the divine name, as when creatures above, on, and under the earth join in the confession that "Jesus Christ is Lord!" (Phil 2:11). In the Christological pattern, unity can appear as the new kinship community created among all who are adopted by the Spirit into Jesus's filial address to God as "Father" (cf. Rom 8:15). In the Pneumatological pattern, unity appears (to take the example of Pentecost) in the capacity of multiple voices to become a mutually intelligible harmony of praise rather than a meaningless cacophony. Also, I should have made more of the fact that the Pneumatological pattern of naming, taken as a whole, is like an ever-growing treasury, some of whose riches may acquire paradigmatic significance (e.g., Lover, Beloved, Love), while not thereby closing the door to or diminishing the value of other less widely known triads.

In closing, I would like to pose a question to Levering himself. In a modest footnote, Levering proposes that followers of Christ should remember the divine name YHWH but not (if I understand him rightly) hallow it or receive it as a name by which God still desires to be known. I wonder whether one can really remember a divine name without knowing and hallowing God through it. What would it mean to do the first without the second, or vice versa? But even if we could make sense of such a distinction, I wonder how one would apply it to, for example, the name Jesus, which means "YHWH saves" (cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, para. 2666). Are we to receive the name Jesus in a way that remembers the name YHWH but refrains from knowing or honoring God in this way? Or again, how would we apply the distinction to the dozens of New Testament texts that cite Old Testament references to the divine name, such as "Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord" (Matt 21:9)? Levering seems to want to rescue the thesis of the Christian kabbalists, but it seems to me their thesis inevitably breaks down under the weight of Christian worship.

PAUL HINLICKY

Hinlicky provides a wonderful summary of my argument and some vigorous questions, and I'm grateful for both. Hinlicky observes that in my view, "Hebrew apophatism—reverencing the divine Name by referring to

it obliquely—honors divine uniqueness not in spite of but on account of the gift of the Name. It does not sign a God beyond God, but gives God in presence and blessing, making this self-donation the true indication of the mystery of divine being in the Trinitarian mutualities." I like this paraphrase so much I plan to crib it for future use. It also leads me to take the first of his concerns very seriously, which is that I sometimes seem to deviate from my own intention by depicting the Tetragrammaton as a pure apophatic sign—that is, as a pointer to a wholly ineffable "God beyond God." As evidence in support of this concern, Hinlicky points to two things.

The first is what Hinlicky terms an "unfortunate" formulation in the final pages of the book, where I write that the divine name points to the "unfathomable mystery of its bearer." Here my response is simple: Hinlicky is right. The passage is unfortunate. What I should have written is that the divine name points to the "unfathomable mystery and *incomparable identity* of its bearer." Elsewhere in the book, I try to make the point that the Tetragrammaton signifies God's mystery and God's identity in equal measure.

Hinlicky's second bit of evidence is less clear to me but goes (I think) like this. Hinlicky observes that I call the first of my three patterns of naming the Trinity (which orbits the Tetragrammaton) "theological," rather than "patrological," as he would prefer. From this, Hinlicky infers that I want "rhetorically to confine patrology to the second, Christological pattern of Trinitarian discourse." By "patrology," I take it that Hinlicky does not mean the mere word "Father," but rather reflection on the first Person of the Trinity *as* the first Person. That is, I take it that Hinlicky uses "patrology" to refer to reflection on the first Person as the unoriginate fontal plenitude from whom the other two Persons proceed and whose eternal identity is constituted precisely thereby.

Now, if it were true that I wanted to confine patrology *in this sense* to any one pattern, while excluding it from the others, then I heartily agree that Hinlicky's concern would be justified. For in that case, the non- or prepatrological patterns (whichever ones they might be) would leave the identity of the first Person dangerously underdetermined, and we might indeed be faced with the specter of a "God beyond God." However, I do not want to limit patrology in this way. Rather, I argue that *in this respect*, the three patterns of naming "say" exactly the same thing. That is, all three patterns exhibit the first Person as the unoriginate origin of the other two divine Persons, and none of them exhibits him as "God beyond God."

What then is the difference between the patterns? Not patrology, but how patrology is expressed. The Christological pattern identifies the first Person as unoriginate origin using the language of Father and Son; the theological pattern speaks of the Giver and Receiver of the one divine name (Phil 2; John 17; cf. 11–12, 201–6, 208–10); the Pneumatological pattern (in the Nicene Creed, for example) speaks of "God of God, Light of

Light." In each case, a "God beyond God" is blocked by the fact that the first Person's hypostatic identity is determined by generative relationship to the second, and of course the third.

These clarifications will be enough, I hope, to dispel Hinlicky's concerns. But I want to draw attention to a further, analogous way in which I employ "the rhetoric of patrology" to discipline our understanding of all three patterns, and the first or theological pattern of naming most of all. I propose that just as each pattern is fully Trinitarian in itself, so also the patterns relate in an analogously Trinitarian way among themselves. That is, they are not only distinct and equal, but also *interrelated*. (Although I do not say so, in the background here is the idea of the eternal Trinity as a thrice-repeated *perichoresis*; cf. John of Damascus and Thomas Aquinas [ST 1a.q.42.a5]). What this means is that there is a certain sense in which the theological pattern is both the fontal source of the other patterns and also *necessarily* explicated by them. Once again, a path behind the first Person to a "God beyond God" is blocked. The first Person is the bearer of the divine name who gives it away without loss. Just so, he makes himself known as the Father of the Son, and as the God who brings forth his own Image, Word, and Wisdom. In sum, the passages that Hinlicky cites that deploy the "rhetoric of patrology" beyond the Christological pattern are not violations of my intention. They *are* my intention.

Hinlicky's other concern touches on my account of Luther, which he finds problematic in several ways. He objects that I charge Luther with "the sin of supersessionism" in an overly broad and undifferentiated way, that what I object to in Luther is no more than what the catholic tradition has said since the New Testament, and that my critique amounts to little more than a rehash of the tired claim that Luther reduces theology to anthropology.

Here I confess my impulse is to urge Hinlicky to read my section on Luther again. While I am no Luther specialist, neither do I see that his criticisms bear much relation to what I actually write. I use the term supersede only once in my discussion of Luther, and then only with reference to his interpretation of the Tetragrammaton in a single text from 1519. Speaking of that text, I write "Luther regards the Tetragrammaton as superseded by the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is, *fulfilled according to its inner meaning and outmoded according to its external form*" (91, italics added). Here what I mean by "supersede" is immediately spelled out by the italicized words. Far from tarring Luther with a broad and sloppy brush, my criticism of Luther's "supersessionism" is clearly defined and narrowly focused.

Turning to the merits of the case, is Luther right to be "supersessionist" on this point? Is Hinlicky right that Luther merely repeats what the Bible and the catholic tradition teaches about the status of the Tetragrammaton in the New Testament?

Here we must fix our attention on the phrase “outmoded according to its external form.” Sometimes the New Covenant fulfills the inner purpose of the Old by antiquating its external form, as Christ’s death does in relation to temple sacrifice. In other cases, however, the New Covenant fulfills the Old by reaffirming an Old Testament practice or credenda in a new and deepened context, as does Christ’s address to God as “Father” in relation to prior uses of this name for God (cf. 2 Sam 7:14, Isa. 63:16, etc.). Now, the question is this: in which of these ways does the New Covenant fulfill the Tetragrammaton? By consigning it to the past or by reaffirming it in a newly deepened Christological and Trinitarian context?

As I carefully point out in my book, Luther is actually *of two minds* on this question. In the text of 1519, Luther argues that the divine name belongs exclusively to the Old Covenant. Elsewhere, however, Luther resolves the question in a very different way, as I show in my discussion of Luther’s work as Bible translator. There Luther makes the divine name a living point of reference for evangelical faith by instructing his printers to employ special typography to signal references to the Tetragrammaton, not only in the Old Testament *but also in the New!*

Hinlicky doesn’t mention my discussion of Luther’s two-mindedness. He concentrates only on my criticism of Luther and overlooks the positive precedent I find in him. This is unfortunate, but what is more odd is that Hinlicky himself seems to share Luther’s double-mindedness without realizing it. On the one hand, he defends Luther’s view of 1519 (i.e., the Tetragrammaton is obsolete) as repeating the teaching of the New Testament itself. On the other hand, he vigorously insists that the New Testament preserves the Tetragrammaton as a “living” answer to the question originally posed in the Old! The thing is, it cannot be both.

For myself, I think that Luther and Hinlicky are correct when they affirm the divine name’s canon-spanning significance and incorrect when they deny it. As I see it, the former view is supported by virtually every chapter and verse of the New Testament and by the catholic tradition before the modern era, insofar as it was aware of the Tetragrammaton at all. The latter view is an innovation of Christian esotericists in the fifteenth century. Pace Hinlicky, sorting this out is not a matter of quibbling about the various meanings of *Aufhebung*. It is a matter of clarifying how the New Covenant fulfills the Old, insofar as this touches on God’s name.

NEIL MacDONALD

I was delighted with Neil MacDonald’s enthusiastic response to my book and by his packed reflections, with which I found myself in general sympathy. I think he is right to say that “*not to employ this [i.e., the theological*