

On the Apocalyptic and Human Agency

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Conversations with Augustine of Hippo
and Martin Luther

Edited by

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Dedicated to Dr. Hans J. Hillerbrand, Professor Emeritus, Duke University, President of the American Academy of Religion in 2004, founder of the “Martin Luther and Global Lutheran Traditions” program unit in 2008, colleague, mentor and friend.

CHAPTER EIGHT¹

AUGUSTINE, LUTHER, AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE SOVEREIGN SELF

PAUL HINLICKY

At the end of her Gifford Lectures, published as *Sovereignty: God, State and Self*, the late Jean Bethge Elshtain invoked Augustine as a resource against the sovereign self of modernity. “Augustine’s fear would be that as we give up God’s sovereignty, other forms of human sovereignty—not of the chastened or limited sort—drive to become superordinate and destructive... The Augustinian pilgrim is one who can challenge the idolatries of his or her day without opting out (as if one could) or fleeing into a reality at least theoretically removed from the vortex of social and political life. The pilgrim of Augustinian Christianity offers up that possibility, as the late antique world makes startling contact with late modernity.”² Elshtain’s attempt to retrieve the Augustinian pilgrim for today comes by way of a parallel detected between late modernity and the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire. Elshtain is thinking of the Augustine of the *Civitas Dei*—not of an earlier Augustine, certainly not the Manichaean Augustine, but also not the Neo-Platonist philosopher. Augustine’s intellectual conversion to Scriptural reasoning—by way of close reading of Israel’s history with God that occupies *Civitas Dei*—was a more protracted process than is evident in the drama of the conflicted heart recorded in the *Confessions*.

This observation concerning *which* Augustine it is that Elshtain invokes makes the relation of Augustine to the sovereign self of modernity rather a more complicated question. It is well known that Descartes retrieved Augustine’s own argument against skepticism—to wit, that I cannot doubt that I doubt—in his invention in the *Meditations* of the “thinking thing” that essentially transcends extended things and rules over them by aid of the knowledge of the God who in turn is in the very busy business of matching the thinking thing’s thoughts to physical events in the external realm of extended things. By retooling Anselm’s so-called

ontological argument for the existence of God, Descartes had inferred from the thinking thing's self-knowledge as a finite, hence imperfectly thinking thing the notion of a perfectly thinking being, hence infinite which conveniently serves to bridge the parallel worlds of thinking things and extending things. While these moves give the appearance of continuity with Augustinian tradition in modernity's "turn to the subject," in fact they invoke the earlier Augustine's relation to Neo-Platonism more than his mature relation to the Bible. This differentiation is important in that the Neo-Platonic paradigm of the mind's coming to self-consciousness is a—or perhaps *the*—singular classical source of modernity's sovereign self.

As Carol Harrison has noted, the intellectual drama of Augustine's long career plots right along this fault line: "The very spirituality of the Platonists, which had resolved so many problems for [Augustine in overcoming Manichaeism], seemed to be totally irreconcilable with a doctrine of the Word made flesh, of his bodily resurrection and of faith in him as the only means for fallen man to grasp truth."³ Along the same lines we could add to Harrison's list of items from the Bible Augustine's own report in the *Confessions* of his bafflement at the God of the canonical narrative, beginning with the first verse of the Bible, "In the beginning, God created..." At what "moment" could the perfect Being have been newly "motivated" to create *ad extra*? The very notion entails divine temporality! The ascent of the soul to its divine source by the acquisition of self-consciousness and the descent of the Biblical God to creation, to history, to incarnation and redemption seem indeed to tell different, perhaps "irreconcilable" stories.

We who are children of the Western cultural tradition still align along this fault line. Some contemporary thinkers—let me mention representatively only the significant Protestant theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg—find Descartes' retrieval and modernization of Augustinian insight into the dynamics of human self-consciousness essential for indicating the theological horizon of ineffable infinity against which the finite self sees and knows its world in space and time and so comes to thematic awareness of itself as subject of knowledge hungering for the wholeness of knowledge that is God.⁴ Others, however, see in Descartes' invention the modern founding of a dangerous trajectory that "dreams of radical transcendence," as Elstain put it,⁵ dangerous in that it must finally and decisively turn against human embodiment itself as ultimate obstacle and final enemy. Descartes' construct of a purely mental self, and its claim to sovereignty over extended things as something alien and inferior, is criticized by Elstain as an intoxicating illusion of power. It is the *sicut deus eritis* (*the serpent's "You shall be as God..."*) Not only does it

institute an invidious mind-matter dualism but in the process configures God as nothing but the transcendental ground of this immanent claim to sovereignty over inferior things. Yet others, like Louis Dupré, try to mediate a chastened modernity,⁶ with a concise and precise critique of Descartes' "merely apparent" Augustinianism. "For a moment," Dupré writes, "the French philosopher reminds us of Augustine's self-examination before God. But only for a moment, because Descartes's introspection reverses the traditional order from God to the soul. All ideas—including the idea of God—have their formal basis in the mind which envisions all beings as *cogitata*... God has to be proven, and to be proven on the basis of the prior certainty of the self." The road to German idealism's creative, self-positing *ego* opened up by Descartes' *ego cogito, ergo sum* thus marks a deep inversion of the mature Augustine, not his retrieval.⁷

Critics of the sovereign self today—and I count myself among them—can be thinkers as widely divergent from Jean Elstain as Gilles Deleuze.⁸ Whether from the side of dynamic nature (*natura naturans*) or the robustly Trinitarian God of Christian tradition (*esse deum dare*), these thinkers deny that the human mind, conceived as something ontologically other than its material body with all its organic links to the entirety of creation, is, can be and/or ought to be "sovereign"—or rather, they posit, that the notion of "sovereignty" is itself fraught and in need of genealogical investigation and critique, such as undertaken by Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer* (as I will briefly discuss below in conclusion). For these the danger of the sovereign self of Cartesian modernity, unthinkingly taken as a matter of course in the modern politics of identity (as Hasanah Sharp has shown in an insightful Spinozist critique⁹), is manifest in modernity's ecologically or economically unsustainable juggernaut; it runs together with a morally unacceptable pauperization of masses of people, ideologically perpetuated and reinforced by the inferiorization of the sensual to the mental.

As powerfully as such critiques of the sovereign self may resonate across a spectrum of contemporary dis-ease, if not dissent, it is very much unclear in this time of transition, ambiguously called "post-modernity," what can take the place of the profound Cartesianism of the modern project, on which philosophically the triumphs of Western political economy in technology are predicated and its hopes nourished. In this new twilight of the West, Augustine, I think, would teach us that technology cannot save us from our greed, *concupiscentia* in his language, nor deliver us from the fatal dynamics of political sovereignty, the *libido dominandi*. Technology rather empowers these dark forces. As C. George Benello has written in an essay on Jacques Ellul, "the domination of technique has

little to do with different political ideologies. Both the Marxist and the liberal-democratic versions of progress are equally uncritical of technique's domination."¹⁰ The sovereign self who would dominate extended things becomes dominated by the techniques of domination. This dilemma or rather juggernaut requires us to probe more deeply.

This digging takes us back to Augustine. In an intriguing article published in the journal *Zygon*, Phillip Cary argues that "[t]he inner self was invented as a place to find God."¹¹ Its roots thus lie, he claims, "in the history of the Western religious tradition and its long involvement with philosophical issues, especially (in this case) epistemology."¹² Turning his focus on the "inner" self, that is, the sheer privacy that Descartes creates by the method of doubt in inventing the sovereign self, Cary traces the genesis of "the mythic reality of the autonomous individual" all the way back to the inner world of Plato and Plotinus. Yet the inner world of the ancients is not yet a private world in comparison to the purely subjective "ideas" in the isolated, individual mind constructed by Descartes and Locke. The "Platonists" rather discovered in the soul "the unchanging realm that is the same for all souls. In essence, they all share one and same inner space" when looking inward, just as by looking outward from their discretely embodied, and thus individuated souls upon the infinite multitude of physical phenomena in the exterior world, they "are diminished and drawn from that primal unity by their diverse interests..."¹³ Hence the Platonic soul is timelessly suspended between the One and the Many, where intellectual ascent leads upward to the One from the soul's fall into the individuated, and thus conflicted existence of the body, where it is dispersed and driven haphazardly by diverse material allures.

A transition in the Platonic tradition towards the modern privacy of the individual soul, Cary argues, comes from Augustine, who is "both deeply attracted to the Plotinian inward turn," and yet finds that as a Christian "he cannot simply accept the inner divinity of the soul, as if deep within us there was no real difference between the Creator and the creature." Thus for Augustine the turn inward to the "space of soul" is not just so, as for Plotinus and Plato, a looking upward into "the eternal realm of the divine Mind" that is the same for all rational souls. Instead, with Augustine—think only of the narrative of his own soul's painful wanderings in the *Confessions*—the one who turns inward enters into "the changing inner world of the individual human soul." This is an "inner space with no roof, open to the light above" as in Plotinus and Plato. All that remains to the groping soul from Augustine's Platonic sources "is the memory of God" as "our long lost happiness" as the "Truth by which all things are true." Thus the lost soul in Augustine is "not an absolutely private space." For

God as Creator remains present to the absent-minded creatures even though they have forgotten God; the new result is that "[o]nly sin separates us from the public realm of inner wisdom... Conceptually speaking, then, the private inner self is born in sin."¹⁴ What Augustine considers to be born in sin, then, is what Descartes discovers as the sole source of certitude.

The soul itself has become historical in Augustine. As Jean-Luc Marion has recently written in a trenchant analysis, Augustine's new twist—the lack of essential definition for the human soul as mind opposed to body, the elevation instead of the relation of being made in God's image for likeness to the ineffable Creator—"implies that I do not reside in any essence, but that on the contrary I resemble what has no semblance, God, without form, indescribable, incomprehensible, invisible... Or, more exactly, that... I appear each time myself according as I move up (or down) on the invisibly graded scale of my resemblance..." to the inimitable Creator.¹⁵ Though Cary does not explicitly note the historicization of the soul that is occurring in Augustine's treatment of the soul's movement in time, as sketched in *Confessions* Book X, it is a notable implication of Augustine's break with Platonism, as Marion sees it. If Platonism considers divinity to be a quality that can be participated in greater or lesser degrees, Augustine thinks of the creature's relation to its Creator in the drama of a temporal history—the plot of which is a contest of loves, so to say, between the love of the proud creature who would ascend and that of the Creator who Himself to descend. Jesus Christ is the likeness of God by which love the sinful soul is both cleansed and restored to its true history, the destiny of the City of God.

If Augustine thus initiates a historicization of the soul, however, moderns like Locke and Descartes have not only wholly privatized the soul so that all that is present to it are its own subjective ideas with no certain relation either to the external world beyond the inner experiences of the senses or to the light of Truth that shines from above. They have all the same also radicalized the tacit claim to sovereignty by claiming truth, indeed the bedrock and indubitable truth, for private "intuitions of the unmediated presence of things," taking this foundationalist claim as a "religious idea" with "deep religious meaning for those who believe in it..." even though the "ultimate provenance" of this remarkable claim to a private sovereignty over extended things, "is not," as Cary concludes, "the Biblical gospel but Platonist metaphysics."¹⁶ Well, it is a singularly radicalized Platonist metaphysics that leaves behind the communitarian virtues of classical Platonism.

Can Augustine's properly differentiated theological reflections on the self, forged not only in his quarrels with skeptics and Manicheans to affirm human agency but also with Pelagius to deny an ahistorical and autonomous human sovereignty, be brought forward in an alternative trajectory today by way of Martin Luther's teaching on the servility, not sovereignty, of free choice in a fallen world? That experiment in thought would only be possible if Luther was in fact an Augustinian, particularly in the doctrine of desire, the love by which any conceivable created thing seeks its beloved—there are those who actually deny this. This denial makes indeed for something of a cottage industry in modern German Protestantism, with fellow travelers in the ranks of Roman Catholic scholarship all too eager to agree with these adversaries, as I shall now show. Luther's Augustinianism, as a matter of truth, upsets both these camps. The plausibility of denying of Luther's Augustinianism arises from the fact that Luther's well-known diatribe against Erasmus does not in a disciplined way distinguish *voluntas*, *arbitrium* and *libertas*. Terminological imprecision, if not equivocation, as a result, produce confusion about just what agency Luther ascribes to human creatures, though in other of his writings, for example, *Two Kinds of Righteousness*,¹⁷ his teaching on human agency is adequately clarified; there he speaks of "our proper righteousness, not because we alone work it, but because we work with that first and alien righteousness" of Christ, given as a gift to faith in Christ.¹⁸ We may stipulate as non-controversial that Luther contends for God's sovereignty, more precisely and in Trinitarian terms, for the sovereignty of the Holy Spirit in enlightening the soul to behold the righteousness of Christ and so receive it in faith as a gift from the heavenly Father. What is controversial is how Luther reconciles this divine sovereignty with human agency, as manifestly—indeed indignantly—he claims to have done in same treatise against Erasmus. The echo here of Augustine, moreover, is unmistakable: "Yet God does not work in us without us; for He created and preserves us for this very purpose, that He might work in us and we might co-operate with Him, whether that occurs outside His kingdom, by His general omnipotence, or within His kingdom, by the special power of His Spirit."¹⁹ The differentiation here between faith's knowledge of the Triune agency of God asserting the Reign (theology) and unfaith's ignorance, hence experience of God's agency as nothing but the opaque general omnipotence that the "natural human being" knows (philosophy), is critical to the proper understanding of Luther.

In *Luther and the Beloved Community* I tried to sort out matters conceptually as follows.²⁰ *Voluntas* connotes the personal dignity of each

person's uncoerced willingness or desire; *voluntas* denotes each embodied soul's natural desire that spontaneously seeks the good and averts from evil. Marion, by the way, discovers exactly the same notion in Augustine, of the love of the soul "trigger[ing] in the heart the same spontaneity that gravity unleashes in the body."²¹ Note that the creaturely freedom of *voluntas* is, like gravity, bounded; the soul must naturally seek the good and avert from the evil. We would regard a person who averted from good and sought evil instead as pathologically ill just as we regard a good imposed coercively upon us as a tyrannical imposition upon our natural freedom to love what we love. The creature's freedom, then, is the freedom to desire what one naturally desires rather than be constrained unnaturally by exterior force, as if coerced to desire what one takes no pleasure in. Luther thus agrees not only with Augustine but with the ancient truism that forms the first sentence of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, "All by nature seek the good;" Luther disputes about *what* goods are to be sought. "It is certainly true," he wrote in his early *Commentary on Romans*,

that the law of nature is known to all men and that our reason does speak for the best things, but what best things? It speaks for the best things not according to God but according to us, that is, for things that are good in an evil way. For it seeks itself and its own in all things, but not God. This only faith does in love.²²

By the same reasoning, Luther denies what is impossible, that free will in the sense of *voluntas* can "freely turn itself in any direction, yielding to none and subject to none." That kind of freedom of desire, Luther says, belongs only to the Creator, not the creature – one must say further for Luther, the self-surpassing Creator of the canonical narrative who dramatically enough can will to love the sinner in Christ, the Triune God who gives wholly in surprising new ways.

In any event, "the condition of this life" of the creature in time, again quoting from the *Commentary on Romans*, "is not that of having but of seeking God." Yet by the same canonical narrative, true desire for God – Luther is commenting on the Pauline statement, "no one seeks God"—is not any longer in the creature's power. As with Augustine, it is lost and remains as but a dim memory that faintly rebukes. Love for God must and does come anew with the power of divine grace that reorganizes the soul's affects: "the very love of God which makes us will or love what our understanding causes us to know. For even if one understands and believes, yet without the grace of God he cannot love and willingly do what he believes and understands."²³ So *voluntas* is freely willing love of

the God who alone can make Himself lovely again to the estranged soul by pouring out His love into its heart—Romans 5:5, surely Augustine’s favorite Bible verse. Infused love in this Augustinian way is not a remnant of Luther’s pre-Reformation theology; the notion saturates *De servo arbitrio*, a book which could equally have been titled, *De Spiritu sancti*. It can mean both God’s love for us in Christ and our love for God with Christ, especially when parsed as Christ’s self-oblation for others and the Spirit’s rapture of those others beloved in Christ.

Arbitrium by contrast to *voluntas* is the freedom to choose between logically non-contradictory paths to a desired good. Denoting meaningful choices in pursuing a desired good, freedom in this sense licenses a plurality of ways: maximal diversity so far as mutually compatible paths in life together. One can glorify God by changing the baby’s diapers or by translating the Psalms into German. Let a thousand flowers bloom; rational freedom of choice governs all things “below us,” that is, the paths by which we live in the world under the God who is above us, yet wholly for us. This authentic freedom of choice is damaged on account of humanity’s exile from Eden. In relation to true love for God, postlapsarian humanity has only evil choices, also, if not especially, in religion. The original free choice to love the Creator above all and hence all creatures in and under God has been squandered by the *sicut deus eritis* and we are thus born into a humanity that has lost this original possibility for righteousness by the fateful sin of origin. Only the historical appearance in our midst of the Spirit-anointed New Adam in His truly human obedience restores choice to true freedom in the double love commandment. And we have this New Adam by virtue of God’s doing this very love for us so that, as cited above, we attain “our proper righteousness, not because we alone work it, but because we work with that first and alien righteousness” of Christ.²⁴

We can add to this list *freedom of action*, a term that Luther himself does not have, but a concept he employs. That would be the power actually to do what one freely desires and chooses. In losing the Spirit, Adam and Eve lost that power to act on the willing choice to love God above all and all creatures in and under God, but in Christ the Spirit is restored. Putting all this together in his highly paradoxical formulation of a *servile free choice* (that he perhaps might better have conceptualized as a *filial free choice*), Luther based himself not only negatively on Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings but also positively on Augustine’s Pneumatology. That is to say, the human person’s integral self turns on an *historical* relation to the Spirit of God for which it forlornly hungers and apart from which it deforms and dies, although in its death throes the sovereign self of

an ontologically desperate *superbia*, so to speak, wreaks havoc on the web of life in distorted relations of malicious envy, *concupiscentia*.

To follow Luther’s paradox as a retrieval of Augustine, one must clearly break with nominalist narrative in which Luther is far too conveniently read by opponents, left and right, of his Augustinianism. The nominalist theology imagined free will thinking of the perfect being as its highest good and acting on that thought to leverage divine approbation. But merely to understand Luther, one must adopt instead the historical framework provided by the Biblical canon’s narrative of the self constituted in its dramatic history with God: of freedom, fall, bondage, redemption, struggle and final liberation. Henri de Lubac, to be sure, denied that Luther had rightly understood Augustine’s teaching on graced nature.²⁵ We can hardly blame him for taking predominant Luther interpreters of his time and place at face value. But in fact de Lubac read Luther through the lenses of the Jansenism controversy and either did not know, or did not weigh, the pregnant formulations of theological anthropology in the Genesis lectures where Luther linked the human as *person* (n.b., not as *nature* as per Marion’s analysis above) and the Holy Spirit *historically*: in the state of original righteousness, Luther writes that “man was righteous, truthful, and upright not only in body but especially in soul, that he knew God, that he obeyed God, with the utmost joy, and that he understood the works of God even without prompting.”²⁶ Sounds like “graced nature” to me! Indeed, Luther continued, this “original righteousness” was a “part of nature,” not some “sort of superfluous or superadded gift.” In the latter case we would be thinking of the loss of something not essential for acquiring likeness to God as humanity’s calling and destiny; hence, there would be no need for the coming of the New Adam and Eve, that is, “if the original righteousness, like something foreign to our nature, has been taken away and the natural endowments remain perfect.”²⁷ But, as with Augustine so with Luther, we are made for God and the Beloved Community, and our hearts our restless till there they rest.

The anthropological linkage here is highly significant for the interpretation of Luther’s mature theology, for he comes to this late formulation in the Genesis lectures after the outbreak of controversy and confusion in his own camp on whether sin is “substantial” or “accidental,” the terminology reflecting a metaphysical scheme from Aristotle that overwhelms the theological distinction from Trinitarianism between nature and person, between image and likeness. Historically speaking, Luther’s thinking in the Genesis lectures was overshadowed by the ensuing conflict between Matthias Flacius Illyricus and Philipp Melancthon and thus his Augustinian

synthesis was obscured by the compromise formulas codified in the Book of Concord for Lutheran Orthodoxy.²⁸

If probes into the theological past along the foregoing lines prove illuminating, perhaps what can interrupt—if not dislodge—modernity’s sovereign self is the coming of the beloved community that Augustine envisioned theologically as the eternal love of the Father and the Son in the Spirit now appearing among creatures as the *civitas Dei* in struggle with the *civitas terrena*. A very promising correlation in this connection is the contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s discovery of Luther’s translation of Paul’s Greek verb, *katargeo*, with the German, *aufheben*, to indicate the way in which Jesus’ death on the cross cancels the sovereignty of law as condemnation by fulfilling the law as love and in this way creating a renewed humanity in the image of God for likeness to God.²⁹ Agamben writes against the “negative dialectics” of the Hegelian tradition for the sake of “restoring possibility to the fallen.”³⁰ This sovereignty of grace, that is, of God who gives, comes by way of what I have elsewhere urged as a “positive dialectics”³¹ in sharp contrast to, indeed conflict with, political sovereignty (*civitas terrena*) founded on the state of exception, in which the lawless impose law and include by excluding. This lawless excluding comes in the name of the sovereignty of the modern self, as Agamben argued against modern Hobbseanism in his penetrating *Homo Sacer*.³² But that is another story.

Notes

¹ This chapter is excerpted from Paul R. Hinlicky, *Beloved Community: Critical Dogmatics after Christendom* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, forthcoming in 2015) and is reprinted here with permission.

² Jean Bethge Elshtain, *Sovereignty: God, State, Self* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 240-1. See further her *Augustine and the Limits of Politics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

³ Carol Harrison, *Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33. Please note that here and in what follows authors are cited as published, without editorial comment or correction. I capitalize Father, Son and Holy Spirit and the corresponding pronouns to indicate their specialized usage in strong Trinitarian personalism. For an account of this usage please see forthcoming, Paul R. Hinlicky, *Beloved Community: Critical Dogmatics after Christendom* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015) Chapter One. I am appreciative of the editors’ acceptance of a position on and practice of theological language other than their own and for the courteous and intellectually honest manner in which this difference was handled.

⁴ Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols., trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 1:113-118.

⁵ Elshtain, *Sovereignty*, 203-226.

⁶ Louis Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 249-253.

⁷ Dupré, *Passage to Modernity*, 117-118.

⁸ See Brent Adkins and Paul R. Hinlicky, *Rethinking Philosophy and Theology with Deleuze: A New Cartography* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

⁹ Hasana Sharp, *Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

¹⁰ C. George Benello, “Technology and Power: Technique as a Mode of Understanding Modernity,” in *Jacques Ellul: Interpretative Essays*, ed. Clifford C. Christians and Jay M. Van Hook (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 92-93.

¹¹ Phillip Cary, “The Mythic Reality of the Autonomous Individual,” *Zygon* 46/1 (March, 2011), 122.

¹² Cary, “The Mythic Reality,” 122.

¹³ Cary, “The Mythic Reality,” 126.

¹⁴ Cary, “The Mythic Reality,” 130-131.

¹⁵ Jean-Luc Marion, “Resting, Moving, Loving: The Access to the Self according to Saint Augustine,” *The Journal of Religion* 91/1 (January 2011), 32.

¹⁶ Cary, “The Mythic Reality,” 133.

¹⁷ *Luther’s Works: The American Edition* [hereafter *LW*] ed. Jaroslav Pelikan et al. (Philadelphia and St. Louis, 1958—) 31:296-306. For Luther references, see *Luther’s Works, American Edition*, 55-vols., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehman, and Christopher B. Brown (St. Louis: Concordia and Minneapolis: Fortress Press), 1955—. Abbreviated: *LW*.

¹⁸ *LW* 31:299.

¹⁹ Martin Luther, *The Bondage of the Will*, trans. J.I. Packer & O. R. Johnston (Fleming H. Revel, 2000), 268.

²⁰ Paul R. Hinlicky, *Luther and the Beloved Community* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 153-162.

²¹ Marion, “Resting, Moving, Loving,” 37.

²² *LW* 25:344.

²³ *LW* 25:225.

²⁴ *LW* 31:299.

²⁵ Henri de Lubac, S. J., *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (NY: Crossroad, 2000), p. 11, but see the strange concession to Luther’s actual teaching made in passing on p. 37.

²⁶ *LW* 1:113.

²⁷ *LW* 1:166.

²⁸ “Concerning the Free Will and Human Powers,” Article II, Solid Declaration in Robert Kolb & Timothy J. Wengert, eds., *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 543-562. See

further, Paul R. Hinlicky, “The Use of Luther’s Thought in Pietism and the Enlightenment” in *The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology*, ed. Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel and Lubomir Batka (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 540-50 and Paul R. Hinlicky, *Paths Not Taken: Fates of Theology from Luther through Leibniz* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 177-222.

²⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, trans. P. Dailey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 108. See the discussion in Adkins and Hinlicky, *Rethinking*, 200-206.

³⁰ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 38.

³¹ Adkins and Hinlicky, *Rethinking*, 179-186.

³² Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). See the discussion of “biopolitical captivity” in Adkins and Hinlicky, *Rethinking*, 114-120. For the alternative, see Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).